Nothing as It Seems

Humanists generally agree that we ought to apply reason, free enquiry, and self-reflection when trying to figure out what is right or wrong. Most of us also think that it is unjustifiable to discriminate against someone solely on the basis of their race, sex, age, or whatever other grouping you can think of. Humanists rightly criticise religions when they defend discrimination against certain groups or individuals by means of scripture, revelation, authority, or, in some cases, tradition. Despite the fact that humanists have over time questioned and, indeed, freed themselves from many of these prejudices, is it possible, nevertheless, that many may still latch onto at least one dogmatic relic of an earlier age? Namely, the prejudice of speciesism. The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations  estimates that around around 60 billion land animals are killed annually in food production— a large proportion of these come from intensive factory farms....

A version of this article was printed in  Humanism Ireland , May-June, Vol. 146 (2014) The notion that our moral intuitions possess epistemic authority has been associated with a number of philosophers within the canon of Western thought.  Roughly speaking, these thinkers have argued that our intuitions have recourse to a unique authority of perception that yields special access to a sphere of moral legitimacy. Others, however, have claimed that our intuitions are incredibly diverse and often conflict with each other—for example, your intuition says assisted suicide is morally permissible and my intuition says it’s wrong. But it seems the two contrasting intuitions cannot both be right. At the same time, most of us think our own moral intuitions are right : they do not seem inconsistent to us, and we have a strong sense to believe them. Accordingly, they strike us as correct. Undoubtedly, moral intuitions can be shaped by our particular culture, environment or co...