Brief Overview of Some Common Arguments against Same-Sex Marriage

In 2001 the Netherlands made history by becoming the first country in the world to legalise same sex marriage (SSM); this feat was soon followed by their closest neighbour, Belgium. Since then several other countries have also amended their laws to permit same-sex couples to marry; they include: Spain, Canada, South Africa, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Iceland, Argentina, Denmark, Brazil, France, Uruguay, New Zealand, Great Britain, and Luxembourg. In addition, 36 states in the US, at present, allow SSM and over 70 percent of its citizens live in places where gay couples can marry. 

There’s a good chance Ireland will soon also join this list. In December the Government announced that a referendum on legalising SSM will take place sometime in May. Public opinion in support of the move has remained steady over the past couple of years: one Irish Times/Ipsos MRBI poll taken just before the Cabinet announcement said that 71 percent support SSM and just 17 percent are against. In spite of this, some proponents aren’t getting complacent, given that polls can be misleading—as we know from previous campaigns. The debate throughout the next number of weeks is expected to stimulate a lot of heat.  

Here, I want to look at some of the common arguments that are often advanced by opponents of SSM, and to show why none of them hold water—either on scientific or ethical grounds.  An approach like this, as John Stuart Mill alluded to in On Liberty (1859), can be useful for a couple of reasons: firstly, SSM opponents (and indeed, those who are yet undecided) are more likely to abandon flawed arguments if they are scrutinised in a fair and open way. Secondly, the course of debate also compels proponents to reassess and refresh their views so to prevent them from declining into unquestioning certainty. It’s not enough to know what is true, according to Mill, but to also know why it is true.

SSM proponents argue that marriage, as it is presently envisaged, is not merely something that includes sexual relations and procreation; it also supports love, commitment, companionship, mutual responsibility, as well as the intellectual desires, interests, and goals of each partner. Once we accept this, they maintain, consistency tells us there’s no good reason society should exclude same-sex couples from marrying. Failing to do so is a form of discrimination. And, furthermore, many same-sex couples are already married (in all but name), and the law should offer them the same kind of rights and recognition as two-sex couples are given. 

Let’s look at some of the common arguments SSM opponents call on to reject this line of reasoning.

1. Marriage is a male-female union

It’s sometimes said that marriage is exclusively defined as a union between one man and one woman. To suggest that two women or two men can marry each other is like saying squared circles exist, or calling a chicken a “duck” (as one American conservative commentator put it). SSM proponents can say the chicken/duck example is not the same kind of thing as marriage. By contrast, marriage is something that is an artificially constructed, human institution that has socially evolved over time—where the margins of which can be arranged and rearranged for specific purposes. Marriage that includes same-sex couples is not what it traditionally has been, but there’s no essential reason to say it cannot do so in the future. In short, it’s not something that is non-malleable. Notice, too, that the argument itself doesn’t have any ethical weight: it merely objects to SSM on definitional grounds.

Opponents often say that throughout most of human history marriage has been one woman and one man, and that there’s no reason why it shouldn’t continue to be shaped this way. There are a number of problems with this view: firstly, many cultural institutions—like slavery or the subjection of women—have also a long history, but no one would say we ought to preserve those traditions. Secondly, it’s historically inaccurate to say marriage has always been a man and a woman. Some societies have embraced polygamy, common-law marriage, arranged marriage, and, indeed, same-sex marriage. Thirdly, even if we are to say most societies have only embraced heterosexual monogamous marriages, it doesn’t mean we should continue doing so: simply because marriage is between one woman and one man, it doesn’t follow that it ought to remain this way.

  

Another objection along these lines, but with more normative force, is that SSM fundamentally redefines the meaning of marriage, and thus threatens to diminish the value of existing heterosexual unions. It is difficult, though, to see how SSM could lead to such consequences—seeing that gay couples want to get married for many of the same reasons as everyone else. Indeed, the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum has pointed out that domestic abusers, tax dodgers, rapists, murderers, child abusers, and racists are all legally entitled to marry, but SSM opponents, curiously, don’t object to some of these individuals marrying on the grounds that it would diminish the value of the institution. Accordingly, those who endorse this argument will have to explain why allowing law abiding gay and lesbian couples to marry would do more to bring the institution into disrepute than the inclusion of individuals with a serious criminal record.            

2. Marriage is suppose to be for engendering offspring

It’s often said that the main purpose of marriage is procreation and the nurturing of children, and it is in our interest to confine marriage to potentially procreative couples. Reproduction, of course, cannot naturally come from same-sex relationships, so therefore we should not grant them the same legal status as two-sex relationships (where procreation is possible). But hardly anyone thinks marriage should only be limited to where procreation can occur. Heterosexual marriages are deemed valid even when couples have no intention of procreating, or where it isn’t an option. If we’re not prepared to view non-procreative heterosexual marriages as invalid, it seems difficult to say why exactly SSM should be though. If procreation is considered essential to marriage, then all non-procreative relationships seemingly fail to meet this condition (whether they are gay or straight).

One response to this, put forward by some new natural law lawyers, is that non-procreative heterosexual marriages are legitimate because couples can still engage in reproductive functioning (i.e. coitus) even if reproduction isn’t possible by way of those acts. Marriage, as a comprehensive union must include a bodily union, and the only way couples can achieve this is with behaviour of a reproductive kind. This rather conveniently explains why it’s permissible for sterile couples to lawfully marry, but not same-sex couples—since they cannot engage in bodily unions of the reproductive kind. But why should we accept penile-vaginal intercourse as an obligatory provision for civil marriage? It seems entirely ad hoc, reductive, and, for that matter, bizarre that a complete marital union can only be met if this particular act is performed. It’s also quite a stretch to claim that penile-vaginal intercourse that is performed by a sterile couple—where conception is almost impossible—could be actually considered as reproductive in nature. Coitus may well be a necessary condition for an act to be of the reproductive kind, but that doesn’t mean it is entirely sufficient either.

Even if coitus is accepted as a sufficient condition, we would still have to concede that there are also some heterosexual couples that would not meet this standard (e.g. certain paraplegics or the terminally ill). Couples, in these kinds of cases, may not be able to engage in reproductive act types. Once more, it would seem inconsistent to not allow same-sex couples to marry, but yet allow two-sex couples (even when coitus isn't feasible). To avoid this conflict, we could say heterosexual marriages are not valid in the absence of coitus either, but I doubt many SSM opponents would be prepared to accept this constraint.     

3. SSM will have a negative impact on children

Opponents often say we shouldn’t encourage same-sex parenting since the best outcome for children is to be raised in a traditional family environment. However, this in itself isn’t an objection to SSM, as you could still be in favour of it without also being in favour of gay parenting. Besides, many children are already being raised by same-sex couples. And, furthermore, it seems difficult to see this as an objection to SSM since the Government has pledged that legislation providing for adoption by same-sex couples will be made law prior to the referendum anyway. Objecting to SSM, therefore, will not do anything to prevent same-sex couples from adopting.

Can we say a concern about same-sex parenting is a reasonable objection to SSM? The premise that same-sex couples are likely to be worse parents than anyone else is not supported by nearly any of empirical evidence. The American Psychological Association (APA) state that the “well-being of children are unrelated to parental sexual orientation and that the children of lesbian and gay parents are as likely as those of heterosexual parents to flourish.”  Several other bodies—like the Canadian Psychological Association, the North American Council on Adoptable Children, the Australian Psychological Society, and the Psychological Society of Ireland—are of the same view. All this is clearly at odds with what many SSM opponents claim.

Having said that, say convincing evidence did emerge, showing that children have better outcomes when raised by their biological parents: would that be a sufficient reason to deny SSM? Not necessarily. Just because X is better than Y, it doesn’t follow that we ought not to permit Y. Nor does it necessarily imply that Y is an unsuitable or bad arrangement. Opponents might say we should always favour what is the best option over other ones, and traditional marriage is the best option for parenting. But if we are to accept this, then the same underlying principle could be applied to other similar instances as well.  

Suppose, for instance, studies prove that children of rich parents do better than children of poor parents, or that children in mixed-cultural marriages don’t flourish in the same way as those from mono-cultural ones. I’m assuming most SSM opponents, on this account, would not be willing to prohibit those marriages. If so, then the relevant question here is why opponents would think it would still be acceptable to permit those marriages, but not SSM? In general, we don’t restrict the marital and parenting rights of couples on the basis of class, ethnicity, occupation, or IQ, even if we know variations on the outcome of children can exist due to those factors. If individual couples can maintain a reasonable quality of care, irrespective of their identity, we should see it as acceptable for them to rear and nurture children.

It is often said that a child deserves the right to a mother and a father. Those who invoke this claim, however, usually don’t offer a reason why this should be taken as a given. As a matter of fact, we can say many children are already being raised within family environments that don’t fit this standard—like those raised by only one parent, grandparents, or older siblings. Should we prohibit them as well? If we say children have a right to a mother and a father as that’s the natural state of human affairs, then the argument is flawed since it commits the naturalistic fallacy. That is to say, it implies that the notion of the traditional family is in accordance with what nature intends, therefore it is good; and that the structure of the non-traditional family is not in accordance with what nature intends, therefore it is wrong. But what does nature intend? And, more importantly, why should we automatically adhere to nature as a guiding moral principle? Ethical arguments like this, which are based on an appeal to nature, should be treated suspiciously.

Perhaps a more valid way of presenting the argument is to say children have a right to a mother and a father, because that is what has the best outcome. Yet, this is an empirical claim and, as was pointed out before, the evidence does not seem to support it. For that reason, we cannot say children on that account have a right to be raised by their biological parents. In all, I think it’s more fitting to say a child has a right to be raised in a safe, stable environment, with at least one responsible adult, than to say, in the more abstract sense, that she has a prima facie right to a mother and a father. And, to be sure, we cannot assume the latter arrangement will be always more desirable, or in the child’s best interest.

   

4. Slippery slope argument

If we say individuals are entitled to marry whomever they wish, provided it’s consensual, then what about polygamous, incestuous, and bestial marriages? One response is to say there’s no evidence to suggest that accepting SSM would incite support for anything like this. But SSM opponents could say that the slippery slope they are invoking is logical, rather than causal; that is, there’s no logical reason to reject polygamous, incestuous, and bestial marriages once we accept SSM. What are the relevant similarities, though, to support this connection? The philosopher and gay rights supporter, John Corvino, has argued that the onus is on those who invoke this argument to give an explanation for it—it doesn’t seem obvious there is one. Those who champion this view, but without offering a plausible reason, are not presenting an argument, Corvino contends, but a sort of “irrational fear”. 

Needless to say, we can rule out bestial marriage, since non-human animals cannot consent. Regarding polygamous and consensual incestuous marriage it is not as simple; discussion on the social acceptability of these practices, nevertheless, should be made independent of SSM. (You can read a broader discussion on the ethics of adult incest here).

5. What’s wrong with Civil Partnerships?

SSM opponents may remind us that the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 already grants same-sex couples the right to register their relationship. Hence, there’s no real need for SSM. One obvious reply is that civil partnerships are not equal to civil marriage, in that they are not invested with the same legal rights. Civil partnerships, for example, don’t allow children to have a legally recognised relationship with their parents in cases where they are not biologically related to each other. They are also denied a number of social supports that are granted to married couples. However, if this is the main criticism we could simply extend those rights to civil partnerships. In doing so, any form of discrimination is eliminated.

That would certainly be an improvement on the present situation, but there is still a disagreement. Firstly, offering same-sex couples the same legal rights, but under a different name, seems rather arbitrary. On top of that, civil partnership unions are relatively recent in Ireland and most people don’t identity them with the same degree of prestige as marriage. Moreover, in light of the fact that gays and lesbians have been strongly stigmatised and marginalised in this country for several decades, this kind of distinction would continue to work towards the notion that homosexuals are unmistakably different from everyone else. If we are serious about granting same-sex couples the same rights and dignity in society as everybody else, then recognising SSM is the most morally salient thing we can do.  

But heterosexual couples are not entitled to a civil partnership—they are discriminated against too.  This is certainly true. However, it doesn’t follow that this should be a reason to be against SSM. Instead, it’s more of a reason to be in favour of civil partnerships for two-sex couples. In view of this, perhaps we should get rid of marriage altogether (at least state recognised marriage) and just have civil partnerships for both same-sex and heterosexual couples. (This, of course, would still allow religious and other organisations free to characterise marriage in whatever way they like.)  I’m sure some would find this to be a desirable alternative, but at the same time I doubt there are sizable requests, at present, for the state to get out of the marriage business. Unless something like this happens, I see no reason why it should be viewed as a legitimate objection to SSM, at least not in the present context.  

In all, marriage doesn't exist for one particular purpose and its meaning has continuously evolved overtime. In modern societies too, marriage is plural in its interpretation and content. A number of objections were examined here, but none of them offer a persuasive reason to not allow same-sex couples the right to marry. 

An edited version of this post was printed in the March issue of Village magazine.