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The ethical debate over same sex marriage




A version of this article was printed in Humanism Ireland, Jan-Feb, Vol. 144 (2014)

About half a century ago, homosexuality was illegal everywhere in the world, with the exception of a dozen or so countries. It wasn't until the 1960s and 1970s that the gay rights movement, supported by the principle of human rights, accelerated. Today homosexuality is legal in about 120 countries—though still banned in several places—and some have even moved towards legally recognising same-sex marriage. In 2001 the first laws enabling same-sex marriage occurred in the Netherlands; since then, fourteen other countries (including Argentina, Belgium, and South Africa) and several other regional jurisdictions have also introduced same-sex marriage.
Homosexuality in the Republic of Ireland was finally decriminalised in June 1993. Despite a slow start, the trajectory of gay rights moved rather fast, with the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 introduced in January 2011, granting same-sex couples the right to register their relationship as a civil partnership; in April 2013 the Constitutional Convention—formed by the Government assigned with considering wide-ranging changes to the Irish constitution—voted in favour of legalising for same-sex marriage by a margin of 79 percent. As a result, in November it was announced by the Government to hold a referendum on gay marriage before the summer of 2015.  An opinion poll taken around the same time as the Cabinet's announcement suggests that 76 percent of voters support the introduction of same sex marriage. This proportion may not be as high when it comes to a referendum as previous polls suggest, but there’s still a very strong chance a majority of the electorate would vote in favour of gay and lesbian marriage.*

In spite of committed opponents of gay marriage acknowledging the fact that the pendulum of popular opinion is now swinging against them, they continue to challenge the mainstream liberal consensus. It would, of course, be spurious to say that gay and lesbian marriage is legitimate because most people believe that it is; at one time, almost everyone believed that the sun revolves around the earth, but they were wrong. Most people, at present, seem to believe same-sex marriage should be made legal, but perhaps they are also mistaken. So, are there any valid arguments against same-sex marriage? Various socially conservative and religious commentators have advanced a number of reasons to defend the traditional paradigm of marriage. Let us consider some of these. 

It is often said that same-sex marriage is unnatural. Marriage by its essence is a male-female union, and to advocate in other respects is the equivalent of wanting to draw a squared circle. Equally, it is questionable whether we can really call heterosexual marriage ‘natural’ either: traditional marriage, some regard, to be nothing more than an artificially constructed patriarchal socioeconomic institution, historically convenient for those who want to control the lives of women within family and social life.

You might say there’s nothing natural about marriage per se, but the traditional ideal of lifelong commitment of one man and one woman, for the purpose of intimacy and child rearing, is the keystone to stability and is therefore something that’s worth preserving.  Yet, the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum, in her 2009 Dessent article, reminds us that the “golden age of martial purity” is a mistaken ideal: “many societies,” she says, “have embraced forms of polygamy, informal or common-law marriage, and sequential monogamy.” 

In ancient Greece, for instance, married men regularly had socially accepted sexual relationships with male and female prostitutes. Divorce was also widespread in ancient Rome, and marriages were “typically not monogamous,” where men were likely to have sexual relations with male and female slaves and prostitutes. In more recent times, to be sure, social standards of monogamy were more widespread, but it’s doubtful whether these norms actually reflected social reality. It’s difficult to examine the reality of marital conflict and break-up, Nussbaum argues, because almost all marriages were not formally terminated until very recently. On top of that, before divorce was a legal possibility, women often had to tolerate “bad marriages, with adultery, neglect, even with domestic violence.” Based on this, it seems difficult to contemplate an epoch of ubiquitous heterosexual martial purity and rapport as anything other than a fairytale.     

Another objection is the argument that the main purpose of marriage is procreation and the nurturing of children. Marriage, in line with its quintessence, is an institution that works for these objectives and it is in our collective interest to confine marriage to potentially procreative couples. Reproduction cannot arise in a homosexual marriage, so accordingly we should not grant it the same status as a heterosexual one. But hardly anyone thinks marriage should only be limited to couples where procreation is probable. If we prohibit same-sex marriage for this reason, it would seem to follow that we should also prohibit heterosexual marriage if one, or both, of the partners is infertile, or where a couple has no intention of child-bearing.  

One response to this—put forward by Sherif Girgis, Ryan T. Anderson and Robert P. George in their book, What Is Marriage? Man and Woman: A Defense (2012)—is that marriage in the latter cases would be legitimate because the couple can still accomplish a “comprehensive bodily union”—coitus—a function that can work towards a common biological end—reproduction. Put simply, marriage requires a comprehensive bodily union and only coitus can achieve such a union. This explains, rather conveniently, why it is reasonable to allow infertile heterosexuals to lawfully marry, but not homosexuals. It’s possible for same-sex couples to engage in sexual activity together, Ryan, Anderson and George contend, but such unions are not comprehensive, given that coitus is not possible. But then again why should we accept coitus as a significant and obligatory provision for marriage? It seems quite arbitrary (and to my mind, rather odd) that a comprehensive marriage can only be accomplished through penis-vagina sex. 

Even if we accept this inference, how can we understand the case of a heterosexual couple were one partner is seriously paralysed and cannot perform coitus? Most people, I presume, would accept marriage in this case as admissible. It would seem inconsistent not to allow lesbian couples to marry purely because coitus cannot be achieved, while permitting straight couples to marry when coitus also isn't feasible. To evade this inconsistency, one could always say that heterosexual marriages are not comprehensive in the absence of coitus either, but I doubt there are many that would be prepared to endorse this position.     

Someone might disapprove of gay marriage for less abstract reasons. An objection variously expressed is that children get on best with their biological parents and gay parents are not as good for them.  However, is this really the case? The evidence supporting the claim is not strong. The American Psychological Association (APA) recognises findings from several studies on same-sex parenting and concludes “that there is no scientific evidence that parenting effectiveness is related to parental sexual orientation.” Further, the “well-being of children are unrelated to parental sexual orientation and that the children of lesbian and gay parents are as likely as those of heterosexual parents to flourish.”

Perhaps we should doubt whether parenting has any significant impact on children at all. The psychologist Judith Rich Harris, author of The Nurture Assumption: Why Children Turn Out the Way They Do (1998), argues that there is not much evidence to support the claim that the way parents rear their children has long-term effects on their personality, intelligence or mental well being. Basing her research on twin studies, Harris contends that a child’s outcome is more likely to result from genes the parents provide and other environmental and cultural factors, like her peer group and chance. In The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature (2002), the evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker has also pointed out that many studies that look at correlations between what parents do and how their children turn out, simply assume there’s a causal relation without really considering possible genetic factors. Not everyone agrees with Harris or Pinker’s thesis that parenting has minimal influence, but perhaps this is due to the ostensibly discouraging conclusions arrived at, than the actual merits of what they claim. It nevertheless magnifies an already mounting challenge to those who argue that children get on best when raised with their biological parents as one of the central reasons to oppose gay marriage and same-sex parenting.

Having said that, say convincing evidence did emerge, showing that children do, in fact, turn out best when raised with their biological parents: would that be an ample reason to deny same-sex marriage? I’m not convinced it would, as it is based on a logical non sequitur. Suppose a study showed that children of rich parents turn out better off than children of poor parents, and that children of parents from one ethnic group turn out better, on average, than children from another ethnic group: would this give legitimate grounds to refuse certain groups of people from marrying or raising children? I think most would be appalled if we prevented couples from marrying on the basis of their salary or ethnicity.

In the same way, I think it is equally wrong to discriminate against couples based on their sexual orientation, even if it could be shown that children, on average, fair out better within heterosexual marriages. We don’t discriminate against the marital and parenting rights of couples based on class, ethnicity, occupation, IQ and so forth, even if we know variations on the outcome of children can exist due to those factors. If individual couples can maintain a reasonable quality of care, irrespective of their identity, we should see it as acceptable for them to rear and nurture children.

It is often said that a child deserves the right to a mother and a father—preferably his two biological parents. Those who say this, however, do not explain why a child’s right is violated if he’s not raised by his biological mother and father. Maybe in a perfect world this condition would be preferable, but quite often children are brought up by adoptive parents, grandparents, older siblings, or with just one parent.  It seems to make more sense to say a child has the right to be raised in a stable, happy environment, with at least one responsible adult, than to say, in the more abstract sense, that he has the right to be raised by his two biological parents. We cannot assume the latter case will always be more desirable or in the child’s best interest.

Someone might still object to marriage equality because the integration of lesbian and gay couples into the institution of marriage could have adverse and unintended consequences on society. It would change society, to be sure, but where is the evidence to suggest it would make things worse? On the contrary, there are a number of reasons to believe it would actually enrich society. To be identified as gay or lesbian, until quite recently, carried a huge stigma and many decided (as some still do) to conceal their true identity: equal marriage opportunity shows that we are prepared to move away from routine homophobia and prejudice—which has resulted in bad outcomes for many—to a position where the state is prepared to give equal marital status and inclusiveness to gays and lesbians.

Moreover, there would be more couples willing to adopt and this would be in the interest of many children: instead of living inside state institutions, a child could be adopted by a gay or lesbian couple willing to give her love and support. Gay marriage may, paradoxically, result in less same-sex couples looking after children. In a recent article for The Philosophers’ Magazine, John Corvino argues that where same-sex marriage is more accepted, “fewer would feel pressure to enter heterosexual relationships for which they are not suited, and thus fewer children would experience the breakup of such marriages.” And if we’re interested in child welfare, Corvino continues, “fewer divorces is surely a good thing.”  
             
Another objection sometimes invoked is that the advancement of civil partnerships to the prestige of marriage fundamentally redefines its meaning, and thus threatens to diminish the value of existing marriages. This sounds unconvincing though: many same-sex couples want to get married for similar reasons to others, and I fail to see how one’s marriage could be tarnished where it was discovered that a gay couple moved into her neighbourhood.  Indeed, Nussbaum points out that “[c]onvicted felons, divorced parents who fail to pay child support, people with a record of domestic violence or emotional abuse, delinquent taxpayers, drug abusers, rapists, murderers, racists, anti-Semites, [and] other bigots” are all legally entitled to get married, once it’s to someone of the opposite sex. Opponents of gay marriage, in this way, will have to explain why the marriage of a law abiding gay couple does more to discredit the institution than the inclusion of paedophiles, sadists and masochists in heterosexual marriages.

Someone might defend current marriage practices purely on the basis of tradition. The union of one man and one woman, they would say, is a feature of society over the centuries, something deeply rooted in our present day culture, and that we should carry on honouring this convention. Yet this argument, it seems, could equally be used as a justification for same-sex marriage. Seeing that homosexuality is now widely tolerated and even celebrated, extending marriage to include gay and lesbian couples, it could be argued, is the best way of honouring and preserving the tradition.

Some liberal commentators have also expressed some qualms about the public discourse surrounding same-sex marriage. In a recent Village article, for instance, Michael Cronin states that: “[t]he political goal of sexual freedom [including gay marriage] has been recruited to a reductively one-dimensional model of progress and modernisation, which serves to validate the prevailing power structures even while apparently questioning them.” As a result, “[s]ituating any radical Left perspective on gender and sexuality is untenable.” Public discourse regarding marriage equality, it is probably fair to say, is in accordance with existing power structures, yet it still seems possible for progressive development to emerge through this model. The legalisation of gay and lesbian marriage will not banish homophobia altogether, and it would be naïve to see it as a teleological endpoint. We should not expect gay rights activists, and those concerned with social justice, to rest easily if, and when, legislation is passed. A more detailed account is probably needed to fully address these points, but that is beyond the scope of my analysis here.

Marriage doesn't exist for one particular purpose and its meaning has continuously evolved overtime. In modern societies, marriage is plural in its definition and content: no longer does it just involve shared domestic life and the begetting and nurturing of children; it also accommodates sexual relations, love and intimacy, friendship and reciprocated care, concern and commitment. When we consider all, or some, of these as perfectly valid reasons for straight people to marry, broadening this vista to include gay and lesbian couples, seems like the morally right thing to do.  Many objections were examined here, but none give us compelling reason to deny same-sex couples the right to marry; gay and lesbian partners, in due course, will be legally allowed to marry in Ireland for sure. 

*Note: the second paragraph was slightly updated to include the government’s intention to hold a referendum in 2015 and the opinion poll figure that was released in early November 2013. 

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